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ABSTRACT 
As the United States systemically increases its renewable energy 
capacity, new approaches for acquiring land corridors are needed to 
develop electric transmission lines. Extensive transmission line 
development is needed to connect our cities to our nation’s remote 
but ample renewable energy resources, such as rural Nebraska’s 
wind. This will require developers to acquire thousands of acres of 
land from private landowners across the country. To minimize the 
risk of landowner opposition, this article provides several innovative 
land-assembly alternatives to the traditional eminent domain model. 
Moreover, many projects will cross state lines requiring siting 
approval from every state that the lines run through. To eliminate the 
uncertainty involved with meeting each state’s unique siting laws, this 
article advocates for the adoption of uniform state siting laws. 
By following the recommendations of this article, the land 
acquisition component for developing new transmission lines will 
become more certain, procedurally efficient, and cost effective. 
Further, the nation will be in a better position to realize the 
significant benefits of new transmission lines through: lowered 
electric rates; improved energy reliability; increased economic 
development, especially in rural areas; mitigation of climate change 
effects; conservation of natural resources; and promotion of energy 
independence, which bolsters national security. 
INTRODUCTION 
The United States has historically benefitted from interstate 
collaboration. In the nineteenth century, collaboration on the railroads 
allowed for a surge in economic activity as goods and ideas traveled 
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the country more readily. Now, in the twenty-first century, the nation-
wide development of renewable energy resources promises to 
promote a significant increase in economic activity. Moreover, the 
development of renewable energy resources will reduce fossil fuel 
dependence, mitigate the effects of climate change, and promote 
national security. 
To implement renewable energy resources in a meaningful way, 
new high-voltage transmission lines are needed. The development of 
new transmission lines will allow our nation’s most ample sustainable 
resources, such as wind and solar, to replace dirty and imported 
alternatives. Some engineers estimate that seven billion dollars of 
transmission investment is required over the next seventeen years to 
properly implement such renewable energy generation.1 
Unfortunately, much of this development is not taking place.2 
In part, the legal process for acquiring transmission corridors has 
frustrated development. The current legal process suffers from the 
following problems: (a) a lack of conformity between state laws for 
siting transmission and condemning land, (b) landowners’ distrust of 
government, developers, and one another, and (c) the inability of 
eminent domain to provide just compensation. Fortunately, solutions 
are available to address these problems. 
First, interstate cooperation should be pursued to create uniform 
state siting and condemnation laws. Without interstate cooperation, 
 
1 Matthew Wald, Ideas to Bolster Power Grid Run Up Against the System’s Many 
Owners, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/13/us/ideas-to        
-bolster-power-grid-run-up-against-the-systems-many-owners.html?pagewanted=all 
(“[C]onducting business as usual between 2010 and 2030 would require $18.5 billion in 
new transmission lines . . . a system designed to integrate renewables like wind energy on 
a large scale would cost $115.2 billion.”). See generally EDISON ELEC. INST., 
TRANSMISSION PROJECTS: AT A GLANCE, v (2013), available at http://www.eei.org 
/issuesandpolicy/transmission/Documents/Trans_Project_lowres_bookmarked.pdf. 
2 Ken Silverstein, America’s Energy Appetite Necessitates Widening Its Transmission 
Belt, FORBES (July 17, 2013), http://www .forbes.com/sites/kensilverstein/2013/07/17 
/americas-energy-appetite-necessitates-widen ing-its-transmission-belt/ (“While the need 
for a more vast and modern grid is widely recognized, restraining factors endure. Utilities 
are pressed to ensure reliability while community groups want to preserve the natural 
habitat. . . . [As a consequence of legal and regulatory fights, investors] get frustrated.); see 
also EDISON ELEC. INST., supra note 1, at iv–v; Diane Cardwell, Intermittent Nature of 
Green Power is Challenge for Utilities, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 2013, http://www.nytimes 
.com/2013/08/15/business/energy-environment/intermittent-nature-of-green-power-is        
-challenge-for-utilities.html; Trevor Graff, Newly Available Wind Power Often Has No 
Place to Go, MCCLATCHY D.C. (Aug. 5, 2013), http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2013 
/08/05/198428/newly-available-wind-power-often.html. 
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disparate state laws will continue to create uncertainty and discourage 
development. These concepts are discussed further in Part I.B. and D. 
Second, earnest public participation efforts can reduce landowner 
opposition to land assembly projects and encourage voluntary 
participation. Public participation creates opportunities for 
landowners to have their concerns addressed before they become 
divisive issues. These concepts are discussed further in Part II.A. 
Third, the use of voting to facilitate collective decision making can 
minimize problems associated with compensation and holdouts. By 
providing landowners with the ability to vote, landowners can assess 
the value of their land and collectively accept or reject offers. This 
framework also allows a majority of consenting landowners to 
overcome a dissenting minority and push economically beneficial 
projects forward. Additionally, voting provides landowners with the 
ability to determine which land uses benefit the public. These 
concepts are discussed further in Parts I.A. and II.B. 
Fourth, common-ownership structures can reduce transaction costs 
associated with landowners’ distrust of each other during the land 
assembly process. Rather than engage in costly administrative and 
legal techniques, deployed to combat neighbors who are acting in 
their own self-interest, landowners can use a short-term co-owned 
corporations to maximizes and fairly distribute profits. These 
concepts are discussed further in Part II.B. 
The recommendations of this Article show great promise in 
creating procedural and cost efficiencies and must be considered by 
transmission providers. Consistent with the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission (FERC) Order No. 1000 (Order 1000) and 
the Federal Power Act (FPA), transmission providers should be 
required to consider these recommendations because they can achieve 
“just and reasonable” rates for consumers.3 These concepts are 
discussed further in Part II.A. and B. 
 
3 Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 824d(a) (2012); SCOTT HEMPLING, ORDER 1000: 
CAN WE MAKE THE TRANSMISSION PROVIDERS’ OBLIGATIONS EFFECTIVE AND 
ENFORCEABLE? 7, 8, 14 (2012) [hereinafter HEMPLING I] (citing Transmission Planning 
and Cost Allocation by Transmission Owning and Operating Public Utilities, 136 FERC ¶ 
61,051 at ¶ 148, ¶ 155 (2011)) (“The mandates in Order 1000, and the means of enforcing 
them, must have their bases in the Act’s consumer-protection purpose. Order 1000 
requires transmission providers to evaluate transmission and non-transmission alternatives 
comparably.”), available at http://www.scotthemplinglaw.com/files/pdf/ppr_ntas-pprs 
_hempling0312.pdf. 
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As the energy demands of our nation evolve, it is critical that the 
regulatory framework also evolves. To encourage transmission 
development, the United States needs a regulatory framework that 
minimizes the time, cost, and uncertainty when acquiring land for 
transmission corridors.4 Without such a framework, the nation will 
likely forgo the opportunity to mitigate the effects of climate change 
and bolster national security.5 Moreover, the nation will also forgo the 
opportunity to realize billions of dollars in economic activity and 
hundreds of thousands of jobs in rural America.6 The jobs would 
include high-paying short-term construction jobs, long-term 
operations jobs and manufacturing work; economic activity would 
result from demand for local supplies, increased taxes, and indirect 
business, such as banking.7 This Article recommends implementing 
uniform state laws for the development of transmission lines and 
including landowners in the planning and profits, so that much of the 
existing uncertainty for assembling land transmission-corridors can be 
resolved and more development can occur. 
I 
PROBLEMS WITH EMINENT DOMAIN 
Widespread development of transmission lines will inevitably 
impact a large number of landowners. As a consequence, there is a 
serious risk that many landowners will oppose development. 
 
4 See Silverstein, supra note 2 (“While the [economic and environmental] concerns and 
the subsequent legal battles are well intended, they oftentimes perpetuate uncertainty. 
[This uncertainty makes] investors . . . skeptical [and causes them to put] money in 
alternative investments . . . .”). 
5 Ashley C. Brown & Jim Rossi, Siting Transmission Lines in a Changed Milieu: 
Evolving Notions of the “Public Interest” in Balancing State and Regional 
Considerations, 81 U. COLO. L. REV. 705, 710–11; 739 (2010); see also Climate Impacts 
in the Midwest, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/climatechange 
/impacts-adaptation/midwest.html (last updated Sept. 9, 2013). 
6 See Johnathan Hladik, CTR. FOR RURAL AFFAIRS, CONNECT THE DOTS: 
TRANSMISSION AND RURAL COMMUNITIES 14–15 (2011) (citing U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, 
20% WIND ENERGY BY 2030: INCREASING WIND ENERGY’S CONTRIBUTION TO U.S. 
ELECTRICITY SUPPLY (2008), available at www.nrel.gov/docs/fy08osti/41869.pdf), 
available at http://www.cfra.org/sites/www.cfra.org/files/publications/Connect%20the 
%20Dots%20Transmission%20and%20Rural%20Communities.pdf; see also Casey 
Francis, Renewable Energy and Economic Potential in Iowa, Kansas, Nebraska, South 
Dakota, CENTER RURAL AFFAIRS, (Oct. 3, 2009, 1:11 PM), http://www.cfra.org/news 
letter/2009/10/renewable-energy-and-economic-potential-iowa-kansas-nebraska-and-south 
-dakota. 
7 HLADIK, supra note 6, at 14–15; Francis, supra note 6. 
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Historically, eminent domain has overcome landowner opposition. 
However, as the United States moves forward with the development 
of renewable resources, fair treatment of landowners is essential to 
avoid opposition, which can slow development and increase costs 
even when eminent domain is available.8 
Eminent domain is the power of the government to take property 
from landowners. The federal government’s takings power is limited 
by the Fifth Amendment, and incorporated against the states through 
the Fourteenth Amendment.9 Current eminent domain doctrine 
provides legislatures and administrative agencies broad condemnation 
authority, so long as their projects promote a “public use” and the 
landowners are provided “just compensation.”10 Many scholars argue 
that the current eminent domain doctrine places an unfair burden on 
landowners and has the potential to promote economic waste.11 
 
8 Michael Heller & Rick Hills, Land Assembly Districts, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1465, 1482 
(2008) (explaining that landowners “can do much to hasten or delay the pace of a land 
assembly through litigation, demonstrations, and sheer political muscle.”); see Amanda 
Loder, Landowners and Towns are Blocking a New Route for Northern Pass, STATE 
IMPACT (Mar. 12, 2012, 11:52 AM), http://stateimpact.npr.org/new-hampshire/2012/03/12 
/how-landowners-and-towns-are-blocking-a-new-route-for-northern-pass/ (detailing how 
landowners opposed to a transmission line refuse to sell, put pressure on neighbors not to 
sell, and try to pass ordinances to slow and make the project more expensive); Edith 
Tucker, SPNHF has P&S Agreements with 4 Landowners to Block Northern Pass, COOS 
COUNTY DEMOCRAT (Aug. 27, 2012), http://www.newhampshirelakesandmountains.com 
/Articles-Coos-County-Democrat-c-2012-08-26-156958.113119-SPNHF-has-PandS-agree 
ments-with-4-landowners-to-block-Northern-Pass.html (“[T]he . . . land conservation 
organization said they believe that the acreage now under agreement lies directly in what 
they called ‘the obvious intended path’ of the proposed . . . high-voltage direct-current 
transmission line project.”); see also Stephanie Hemphill, Xcel Ends Agreement on 
Goodhue Wind,  MPR NEWS (July 24, 2013), http://minnesota.publicradio.org/display 
/web/2013/07/24/wind-problems?refid=0 (explaining that an unpopular wind farm project  
lost a contract and risks not meeting permit deadlines due to landowner opposition); Paul 
Kessinger, Large Crowd Shows up for KCC Hearing, MARYSVILLE ADVOC. (Aug 14, 
2013, 4:53 PM), http://www.marysvilleonline.net/articles/2013/08/16/news/doc520be6e 
28b049596574082.txt (“‘My land is not for sale,’ was an oft-used phrase among 
landowners at the [public] hearing and it drew plenty of applause [to show support for the 
opposition of the proposed interstate transmission line].”). 
9 U.S. CONST. amend. V; Chi. Burlington and Quincy R.R. v. City of Chi., 166 U.S. 
226, 233–34 (1897) (incorporating the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment against the 
States through the Fourteenth Amendment). 
10 Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005). 
11 E.g., Nathan Burdsal, Note and Comment, Just Compensation and the Seller’s 
Paradox, 20 BYU J. PUB. L. 79, 81, 86, 89–90 (2005); Heller & Hills, supra note 8, at 
1481–82. 
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A. Just Compensation 
In theory, just compensation should place landowners in the same 
financial position they would have been in had the taking of their 
property never occurred.12 Currently, compensation is determined by 
assessing the fair market value (FMV) of the land. FMV is the 
theoretical market value a willing buyer and willing seller would 
reach in a voluntarily transaction.13 However, condemnation 
proceedings overlook the fact that landowners are not willing 
sellers.14 As a result, the proceedings ignore landowners’ subjective 
values that are in excess of FMV.15 Additionally, the use of eminent 
domain creates a risk that the economic benefits of a project will be 
offset by significant administrative and legal costs.16 Due to these 
deficiencies in the current just compensation model, a better 
framework is needed. 
First, the just compensation model tends to undercompensate 
landowners because it ignores individuals’ anthropocentric 
valuations.17 In other words, FMV does not account for personal 
preferences, emotional sentiment, community bonds, or suitability of 
land for particular uses.18 For instance, if a governmental entity 
condemned a landowner’s generational home and family farm in 
order to construct a transmission line, the owner’s subjective value 
may exceed the FMV. This is especially true if the owner found value 
in the fact that his great-grandfather had built most of the structures, 
intended to pass the farm to his children, and he himself had strong 
ties to the community.19 Empirical evidence from court proceedings 
 
12 Burdsal, supra note 11, at 80; see also 26 AM. JUR. 2D Eminent Domain § 271 (2014) 
(“The compensation to which the owner is entitled is the full and perfect equivalent of the 
property taken, in combination with compensation for the damage inflicted by the 
taking.”). 
13 Burdsal, supra note 11, at 91. 
14 Id. at 91–94. 
15 Id. at 83–85, 93–94. 
16 Id. at 90. 
17 Heller & Hills, supra note 8, at 1479–80. 
18 Heller & Hills, supra note 8, at 1479; Amnon Lehavi & Amir N. Licht, Eminent 
Domain, Inc., 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1704, 1718 (2007). Burdsal, supra note 11, at 83, 93. 
19 See Burdsal, supra note 11, at 87–89; Chris Dettke, Comment to Kansas Corporation 
Commission: Deny Clean Line’s Above Ground High Voltage Transmission Lines, 
CHANGE.ORG, http://www.change.org/p/kansas-corporation-commission-deny-clean-line   
-s-above-ground-high-voltage-transmission-lines-3 (last visited Oct. 25, 2014); see also 
John Green, Power of Farmers Put to Test, HUTCHNEWS.COM (Apr. 14, 2013), 
http://www.hutchnews.com/news/power-of-farmers-put-to-test/article_2d7bfee9-1f6a-5df  
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confirms this tendency of the FMV model to undercompensate 
landowners.20  
As a consequence of the FMV model’s inability to determine the 
true cost of condemning land, there is a risk that eminent domain 
proceedings could support projects that, on the whole, destroy 
economic value.21 Expanding on the family farm example, if one 
hundred landowners assign an average value of $300,000 to their 
family farms for a total of $30 million, but an assessor assigns an 
average FMV of $250,000 for a total of $25 million, there would be a 
difference in “value” of $5 million. If the farms were then condemned 
for a transmission project that resulted in a net societal benefit of $27 
million, society would realize an economic loss of $3 million and the 
families in aggregate would realize an economic loss of $5 million. 
One could argue that the families’ values are illogical, but if those 
values are genuinely derived from the owners' anthropocentric 
perceptions, society has truly experienced a loss.22 
Second, the current just compensation model also has the potential 
to create economic waste through legal and administrative costs.23 As 
noted above, FMV tends to undercompensate landowners. When this 
occurs, landowners sometimes challenge the compensation award in 
court, creating legal costs. These costs can be significant and may 
include greater land valuations and litigation expenses.24 For instance, 
the City of Garden Grove, California, condemned a property for 
$640,000 and the landowner challenged the valuation.25 The City lost 
the challenge and had to pay $1,070,000 for the property and 
$620,000 in attorney’s fees.26 In cases like this, the economic benefit 
that a condemning entity hopes to achieve can easily be offset by 
legal costs and higher land valuations. 
In addition to potential legal costs, administrative costs are a 
guaranteed source of economic waste in every eminent domain 
proceeding. Administrative costs are incurred through “obtaining 
 
2-84ac-cedd764329e6.html?mode=jqm; David Shaffer, ‘Buy the Farm’ Law Not Working, 
Minnesota Landowners Say, STAR TRIB. (Feb. 12, 2013, 10:59 PM), http://www.star 
tribune.com/business/190949201.html. 
20 Burdsal, supra note 11, at 84, 90–91. 
21 Id. at 86; see also Heller & Hills, supra note 8, at 1481–82. 
22 See Burdsal, supra note 11, at 86–87. 
23 Id. at 90. 
24 Id. at 90–91. 
25 Id. (citing Property Rights Victories, ORANGE COUNTY REG., Nov. 26, 2000). 
26 Id. 
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legislative authority, drafting and filing a complaint, serving process, 
[and] securing a formal appraisal . . . .”27 Due to these costs, many 
scholars believe voluntary market transactions, which lack 
administrative and legal costs, are more efficient than eminent domain 
proceedings.28 
The goal of just compensation should be to return property owners 
to a financial position that is truly equal to the position that they 
would have been if the taking of their property had never occurred. 
As illustrated above, however, just compensation depends on FMV, 
which fails to adequately assess the owners’ actual financial position. 
Because FMV fails to accomplish this goal, the government fails to 
assess the true cost of projects, which encourages economic waste and 
burdens landowners. This is especially troubling when taxpayers or 
ratepayers fund the project. Some scholars believe that the just 
compensation and public use models should be modified to require 
experts to more accurately assess values and public need.29 Others 
argue that eminent domain should be discontinued in most 
circumstances, excluding essential public works projects.30 This 
article follows the latter position and advocates for the use of 
collective decision making, common ownership, and public 
participation to maximize voluntary participation and to achieve fairer 
compensation. 
B. Public Use 
In Kelo v. City of New London, the Court found that the term 
“public use” provides local governments with expansive eminent 
domain authority.31 In Kelo, a local government condemned a 
neighborhood including an unblighted home for the purpose of 
encouraging economic development.32 The Court held that the need 
for economic development was an appropriate public use.33 However, 
the Court noted that states could impose more stringent public use 
 
27 Id. at 90. 
28 Id. at 88–90 (citing Thomas W. Merrill, The Economics of Public Use, 72 CORNELL 
L. REV. 61, 77–78 (1986)). 
29 Heller & Hills, supra note 8, at 1470–71. 
30 Id. at 1470–71, 1494. 
31 Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 488–490 (2005). 
32 Id. at 473–75. 
33 Id. at 488–90. 
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requirements.34 Therefore, Kelo represents a constitutional floor, 
which states can exceed. 
In response to Kelo, most states enacted legislation that defined 
public use more narrowly.35 In Missouri, for example, the legislature 
withdrew condemnation authority for projects with the sole purpose 
of encouraging economic development.36 Other states left intact 
preexisting law that have the effect of limiting the Kelo holding. In 
Michigan, for example, condemnation authority remains limited to 
projects that protect public health, safety, and to other instances where 
“saving elements” are present.37 As a consequence of these 
independently developed public use requirements, interstate 
transmission developers face uncertainty and legal costs when 
attempting to comply with the laws of multiple states.38 
C. Transmission Projects and the Determination of Need 
As a part of the public use requirement in an eminent domain 
proceeding, the condemning entity must make a determination of 
need.39 In Kelo, the Court noted that deference should be afforded to a 
determination of need, relying on the doctrines of federalism and 
separation of powers.40 The determination of need is a balancing test 
that weighs the benefits against adverse effects of a project—many 
states limit their analysis to in-state concerns.41 In-state benefits 
associated with transmission projects include improved reliability, 
 
34 Id. at 489–90 (citing County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765 (Mich. 2004)). 
35 50 State Report Card: Tracking Eminent Domain Reform Legislation Since Kelo, 
CASTLE COALITION, http://castlecoalition.org/index.php?option =com_content&task=view 
&id=57&Itemid=113 (last visited Oct. 25, 2014) (noting that “44 states have passed new 
laws aimed at curbing the abuse of eminent domain for private use.”). 
36 MO. ANN. STAT. § 523.271(1) (West 2012) (“No condemning authority shall acquire 
private property through the process of eminent domain for solely economic development 
purposes.”). 
37 Cnty. of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d. 765, 783–84 (Mich. 2004) (expressing a 
conservative takings rule premised on the state’s police power to protect health and safety. 
The court noted three factors it called saving elements: (1) eminent domain would be 
required for assembling the project, (2) the project would be subject to public oversight 
after being sold, or (3) the project served the public good.). 
38 See Jim Rossi, The Trojan Horse of Electric Power Transmission Line Siting 
Authority, 39 ENVTL. L. 1015, 1024–26 (2009). 
39 See 26 AM. JUR. 2D Eminent Domain § 33 (2012) (explaining that “the 
[condemnation entity] must consider all public benefits of the proposed taking against all 
the burdens and social costs suffered by every affected property owner.”); Kelo, 545 U.S. 
at 483, 488–90. 
40 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 482–83. 
41 Rossi, supra note 38, at 1019, 1021. 
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efficiency, economic development, and the direct provision of power 
to citizens.42 The adverse effects analysis is primarily concerned with 
the local environment and the impact a project will have on fauna, 
parks and wilderness, watersheds, aesthetics, air quality, farming, and 
human health.43 Additionally, economic effects are also considered, 
such as changes to energy rates.44 Traditionally, if a project does not 
directly provide power to citizens, the project will be rejected.45 An 
example of this comes from Mississippi, where a transmission project 
was rejected because it would have brought power generated in 
Mississippi to consumers in Louisiana.46 
Some states’ short-sighted laws have stymied society’s ability to 
take advantage of the benefits from interstate transmission 
development.47 The many benefits of interstate transmission include 
national energy independence, reduced greenhouse gas emissions, 
conservation of natural resources, and regional economic 
development.48 
The transmission siting process also requires a determination of 
need.49 This requirement is a historic remnant from the 
noncompetitive era that protected consumers from paying for 
unnecessary infrastructure built solely to increase the utilities’ 
revenues—a problem now mitigated by market competition from 
unregulated entities, like merchant transmission developers.50 A 
determination of need for the siting process typically goes by one of 
two names, “certificate of need” (CN) or “certificate of public 
convenience and necessity” (CPCN).51 The certificates are commonly 
obtained from local governments and state public utility 
 
42 Id.; Rossi & Brown, supra note 5, at 724. 
43 Rossi, supra note 38, at 1021–22. 
44 Rossi & Brown, supra note 5, at 721, 726–27. 
45 Id. at 725; Rossi, supra note 38, at 1019. 
46 Miss. Power & Light Co. v. Conerly, 460 So. 2d 107, 113 (Miss. 1984). 
47 Rossi & Brown, supra note 5, at 739–41. 
48 Id. at 710-11. 
49 Id. at 721. 
50 Id. at 728–31. 
51 Alexandra B. Klass, Univ. of Minn. Sch. of Law, Takings and Transmission, 
Presentation at the 14th Annual Conference on Litigating Takings Challenges to Land Use 
and Environmental Regulation, 3 (Nov. 18, 2011) [hereinafter Klass I]; Alexandra B. 
Klass, Takings and Transmission, 91 N.C. L. REV. 1079, 1114 n. 220 (2012) [hereinafter 
Klass II] (expanding upon Klass' presentation at the 14th Annual Conference on Litigating 
Takings Challenges to Land Use and Environmental Regulation). 
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commissions.52 Granting authorities tend to limit a determination of 
need to in-state concerns and some only grant certificates to 
traditional utilities.53 
As a result of the current legal framework, non-utilities and utilities 
lacking in-state customers may not have access to “the full benefits of 
siting approval, including the power of eminent domain.”54 Lack of 
eminent domain authority almost halted the Montana Alberta Tie 
Line, which would have been aborted had it not been for the Montana 
legislature quickly passing a bill that granted eminent domain 
authority to transmission developers who comply with siting 
requirements.55 The preservation of antiquated and disparate state 
laws represents an unnecessary obstacle blocking society from 
realizing the tremendous benefits of interstate transmission 
development.56 
D. Where We Are and Where We Need to Go 
Many scholars and courts believe that voluntary land transactions 
should be pursued in most situations.57 However, this view is 
frequently rejected because courts often condemn land and many 
scholars preach that holdouts are unavoidable and impede economic 
progress.58 While eminent domain may be appropriate for essential 
public works and emergencies,59 defaulting to the use of 
condemnation authority without thoughtful analysis is ill-advised.60 
 
52 Klass I, supra note 51, at 3; Klass II, supra note 51, at 1114 n.220. 
53 See Brown & Rossi supra note 5, at 719–721, 739–40. 
54 Id. at 720. 
55 Klass I, supra note 51, at 5 (citing H.B. 198, 62d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mont. 2011), 
MATL L.L.P. v. Salois, 255 P.3d 158 (Mont. 2011)). 
56 See Brown & Rossi, supra note 5, at 770. 
57 See Burdsal, supra note 11, at 89–90. 
58 E.g. Heller & Hills, supra note 8, at 1469 (“Land sits idle in a tragedy of the 
anticommons—the wasteful underuse caused by too-abundant entitlement holders.”). 
59 Even the dissenting opinion in Kelo recognized traditional doctrine allows “the 
sovereign [to] transfer private property to private parties, often common carriers, who 
make the property available for the public’s use—such as with a railroad, a public utility, 
or a stadium.” Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 498 (2005) (O’Connor, J., 
dissenting). The public benefits derived from developing more transmission are economic 
development, reliability, mitigation of climate change, and lower rates. Klass brings up the 
point that merchant development might blur the line between common carrier and 
economic development. Klass supra note 51, at 1096–97. 
60 See Heller & Hills, supra note 8, at 1481–82. 
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First, frequent use of eminent domain erodes liberty and property 
rights.61 Some eminent domain proceedings may even violate the due 
process clause.62 Second, indiscriminate granting of condemnation 
authority can lead to a lack of adequate economic screening and 
promote projects that destroy economic value.63 Third, eminent 
domain proceedings create conflicts of interest where the government 
must choose between industry and individuals.64 
FERC, in recognition of the importance of interstate transmission, 
has taken steps to improve the regulatory climate.65 However, legal 
and political developments delay further progress.66 While some 
states are in support of the development of interstate transmission,67 
sufficient cooperation between states has not taken place. Without 
more deliberate and widespread interstate cooperation, the 
inconsistencies of state public use requirements, siting practices, and 
 
61 See Lehavi & Licht, supra note 18, at 1716. 
62 Under the Natural Gas Act, FERC merely provides a hotline to affected landowners, 
which appears to provide no meaningful review of complaints. This is a wholly 
undemocratic process, as FERC employees are not elected. Therefore, if a landowner is 
unhappy with the result, he cannot remedy the situation by voting for a new official. This 
raises concerns about accountability and the constitutionality of administrative agencies, 
especially when one considers the deference given to administrative agencies in cases like 
Chevron. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 866 
(1984). 
63 Burdsal, supra note 11, at 86. 
64 See Lehavi & Licht, supra note 18, at 1725–26. 
65 Alexandra B. Klass & Elizabeth J. Wilson, Interstate Transmission Challenges for 
Renewable Energy: A Federalism Mismatch, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1801, 1821–25 (2012) 
(citing Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-discriminatory 
Transmission Services by Public Utilities; Recovery of Stranded Costs by Public Utilities 
and Transmitting Utilities,62 Fed. Reg. 12, 274 (Mar. 14, 1997) (to be codified at 18 
C.F.R. pt. 35); Open Access Same-Time Information System and Standards of Conduct, 
75 FERC  ¶ 61,078 (1996); 136 FERC ¶ 61,051; Regional Transmission Organization, 65 
Fed. Reg. 12, 088 (Mar. 8, 2010) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35); Federal Power Act, 
16 U.S.C. §§ 791–828c (2012)). 
66 Brown & Rossi, supra note 5, at 746–47, 767-68 (citing American Clean Energy and 
Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. (2009), commonly known as the “Waxman-
Markey Bill”; American Clean Energy Leadership Act of 2009, S. 1462, 11th Cong. 
(2009); Ill. Commerce Comm’n v. FERC, 576 F.3d 470, 476-77 (7th Cir. 2009)). 
67 Klass I, supra note 51, at 4 (citing Square Butte Elec. Coop. v. Hilken, 244 N.W.2d 
519 (N.D. 1976); Jim Malewitz, Wind, Solar Could Benefit from Kansas Transmission 
Compact, MIDWEST ENERGY NEWS (July 29, 2013), http://www.midwestenergynews 
.com/2013/07/29/wind-solar-could-benefit-from-kansas-transmission-compact/. 
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other laws will continue to act as a barrier for transmission 
development.68 
Legislatures must adopt uniform eminent domain and siting laws to 
encourage interstate transmission development. Moreover, as 
described in Part II, the problems associated with eminent domain can 
be minimized by encouraging voluntary participation when 
assembling land using public participation techniques, common 
ownership structures, and collective decision making. Following these 
recommendations would ultimately allow landowners and society to 
benefit from the development of interstate transmission lines. 
II 
REMEDYING THE DEFICIENCIES OF EMINENT DOMAIN: HOW 
LAND SHOULD BE ACQUIRED 
This article suggests two strong solutions for remedying the 
deficiencies of eminent domain. The first solution is the widespread 
adoption of public participation techniques to encourage voluntary 
participation and limit landowner opposition. The second solution is 
the adoption of an organizational structure that utilizes collective 
decision making and common ownership to remedy the subjective 
valuation and holdout problems. 
A. Public Involvement or Private Information: Which Path to Take? 
Academic research and real world examples show that the public 
involvement approach limits holdouts and encourages voluntary 
participation.69 However, without the aid of condemnation authority, 
the public involvement approach will likely still produce holdouts.70 
Therefore, in instances where eminent domain is unavailable, some 
might prefer the private information approach. 
However, this is not the signal that should be sent to merchant 
transmission developers as a matter of sound national policy.71 The 
 
68 Disparate state laws represent a barrier to developers by discouraging initiation of 
research and blocking access to capital. Ultimately, disparate state laws create uncertainty 
and discourage socially beneficial projects. See Silverstein, supra note 4. 
69 JOSHUA M. DUKE & DANIEL W. BROMLEY, THE LAND ASSEMBLY PROBLEM: 
HOLDOUTS AND INCOMPLETE INFORMATION IN A POST-KELO WORLD 3 (2009) 
(explaining that information asymmetry is the primary obstacle to voluntary transactions), 
available at http://www.researchgate.net/publication/228424685_The_Land_Assembly 
_Problem_Holdouts_and_Incomplete_Information_in_a_Post%27Kelo_World. 
70 Id. at 11, 25. 
71 Id. at 3, 26; see Brown & Rossi, supra note 5, at 719–21, 739–40. 
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use of the private information approach—not telling landowners why 
land is being assembled—is not well suited for transmission projects 
because after a few projects landowners will quickly learn to distrust 
and likely oppose these much needed projects. Therefore, it is the 
recommendation of this article that developers assemble transmission 
corridors by engaging with the public. Moreover, eminent domain 
authority should only be used if the condemning authority 
demonstrates a good faith effort to engage the public. 
Holdouts can cause projects to fail or experience significant delay. 
Holdouts occur when sellers take advantage of their monopoly power, 
as the sole possessor of a unique piece of property, and attempt to 
extract excessive profits from the project.72 
In the context of transmission development, holdouts are a problem 
because the number of landholders that are needed to form a 
consensus can be great. In the analogous context of assembling a 
highway corridor, Professor Richard Epstein said: 
There are probably, at a guess, a hundred thousand or more 
landowners from whom you would have to assemble rights of way 
in order to build [a highway] between Chicago and New Orleans. If 
you announce that there are only six or eight alternative routes that 
you could have, each one of which could be blocked by one 
landowner under the circumstances, that would be a recipe for 
disaster . . . . It simply cannot be denied that the holdout problem is 
very, very devastating.73 
1. Public Involvement Approach 
A good-faith effort to involve the public would reduce the number 
of landowners who oppose a project. First, providing landowners with 
ample information mitigates the risk of holdouts caused by fear of a 
developer behaving opportunistically. Second, an open dialogue 
allows developers to proactively address landowner concerns. 
Studies show that imperfect information causes mutually beneficial 
deals to break down due to a party’s inability to verify the other 
party’s claims.74 For landowners, this occurs because they do not 
 
72 Heller & Hills, supra note 8, at 1473. 
73 Walter Block & Richard Epstein, Debate on Eminent Domain, 1 N.Y. UNIV. J.L. & 
LIBERTY 1144, 1151 (2005). 
74 DUKE & BROMLEY, supra note 69, at 3 (“[I]nformation asymmetry is the 
predominant reason for failure in the land-assembly market . . . .”); see also SEAN M. 
COLLINS & R. MARK ISAAC, HOLDOUT: EXISTENCE, INFORMATION, AND CONTINGENT 
CONTRACTING 14–15 (2011) (“[It may be difficult in some circumstances for] the buyer  
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know what share of a developer’s profit they will receive and cannot 
independently confirm what they are told.75 For developers, this 
occurs because they do not know landowners’ subjective valuations.76  
In a 2009 article, Joshua Duke and Daniel Bromley argue that this 
information asymmetry is the primary obstacle to voluntary 
transactions.77 Therefore, providing landowners with more 
information should reduce holdouts as well as the transaction costs 
associated with attempting to overcome holdouts.78 
However, even when developers provide information to the public, 
imperfect information still persists because the landowner’s 
subjective values remain private.79 This creates a strong bargaining 
position for landowners if eminent domain is not available.80 One way 
to close the information gap is to assess the subjective land valuation 
that each landowner holds.81 This can be accomplished by looking at 
the factors that make an individual landowner operate differently than 
a hypothetical willing seller, such as their duration of occupancy, 
nature of use, proximity of the land to places-of-interest, and 
personality.82 A better solution to this problem is creating a collective 
decision-making entity, because it aggregates landowners into a 
single decision-making body. 
Earnest engagement with the public allows developers to resolve 
many potentially divisive issues early on in the planning process. 
Through the use of the techniques discussed below, developers can 
identify opponents and resolve conflicts before opposition becomes 
entrenched. Moreover, developers can gather useful information from 
the public, such as the location of private cemeteries, to help prevent 
unnecessary routing delays. 
 
and sellers to come to an agreement because the buyer faces a capital constraint that sellers 
have no credible way of verifying.”), available at http://library.constantcontact.com 
/download/get/file/1102608159425-476/Collins_Isaac_Holdout_JLE.pdf. 
75 COLLINS & ISAAC, supra note 74, at 14–15. 
76 See DUKE & BROMLEY, supra note 69, at 10–11. 
77 Id. at 3. 
78 See id. at 17; Lehavi & Licht, supra note 18, at 1732–33. 
79 DUKE & BROMLEY, supra note 69, at 11. 
80 Id. at 25. 
81 EDWARD P. EICHLER & MARSHALL KAPLAN, THE COMMUNITY BUILDERS 61 
(University of California Press 1967). 
82 Id. 
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Additionally, FERC Orders 890 and 1000 encourage robust public 
participation.83 The orders accomplish this by requiring transmission 
planners to seek comment from customers and stakeholders in 
regional planning.84 Though the orders are silent in the context of 
assembling land for specific transmission lines, the wisdom of the 
orders should be applied to individual projects. Ultimately, a good-
faith public participation approach would likely encourage efficient 
processes and lower costs.85 Therefore, transmission providers should 
adopt the public involvement approach.86 Below is an analysis of two 
public involvement case studies that outline successful industry 
practices and demonstrate the merit of earnestly pursuing public 
involvement. 
a. Western Area Power Administration Case Study 
The Western Area Power Administration (WAPA), a federal 
power-marketing agency under the Department of Energy, is 
successful at implementing public involvement techniques. WAPA 
transmits power through 17,000 miles of line but has only utilized 
eminent domain 4% of the time.87 This is far better than the 10% 
 
83 Preventing Undue Discrimination and Preference in Transmission Service, 72 Fed. 
Reg. 12,266, 12,322 (Mar. 15, 2007) (requiring that transmission providers “provide for 
the timely and meaningful input and participation of customers into the development of 
transmission plans”); Transmission Planning and Cost Allocation by Transmission. 
Owning and Operating Public Utilities, 136 FERC ¶ 61,051, ¶ 216 (“We believe that 
public utility transmission providers, in consultation with stakeholders, are in the best 
position to determine whether to consider in a transmission planning process any public 
policy objectives beyond those required by this Final Rule.”); 136 FERC ¶ 61,051, ¶ 151 
n.143 (“The term ‘stakeholder’ is intended to include any party interested in the regional 
transmission planning process.”). 
84 Under FERC Order No. 1000, stakeholders are broadly defined as interested parties. 
136 FERC ¶ 61,051, ¶ 151 n.143. 
85 Through the earnest use of public involvement techniques, landowner opposition is 
less likely and satisfaction is more likely. See Jody Freeman & Laura I. Langbein, 
Regulatory Negotiation and the Legitimacy Benefit, 9 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 60, 62, 67, 80–
81, 109–10 (2000) (discussing comprehensive study of EPA’s negotiated rulemaking 
process, which found that negotiations reduce conflict and increase participant satisfaction 
and commitment to results); see DUKE & BROMLEY, supra note 69, at 3; COLLINS & 
ISAAC, supra note 74, at 14–15. As a consequence, projects are less likely to be delayed 
and will cost less. See Heller & Hills, supra note 8, at 1482; Burdsal, supra note 11, at 88-
90; see, e.g., Loder, supra note 8. 
86 HEMPLING I, supra note 3, at 7–8, 14. 
87 W. AREA POWER ASS’N, TRANSMISSION LINE SITING: ONE AGENCY’S APPROACH 
TO PUBLIC INVOLVEMENT 6 (n.d.), available at http://www.westgov.org/wieb/electric/5    
-01trans /transmission%20line%20siting%20paper-wapa.PDF [hereinafter WAPA]. 
GERSTLE (DO NOT DELETE) 12/15/2014  8:28 AM 
552 J. ENVTL. LAW AND LITIGATION [Vol. 29, 535 
average for federal agencies.88 WAPA accomplishes this by keeping 
stakeholders well informed, and provides them opportunities to be 
heard in the decision-making process.89 
WAPA follows the International Association for Public 
Participation’s (IAPP) level of participation labeled “involve.”90 This 
means that the agency “work[s] with [the public] to ensure that . . . 
concerns . . . are directly reflected in the alternatives developed and 
provide[s] feedback on how the public influenced the decision.”91 
WAPA believes that each public involvement activity must be 
tailored to the particulars of a project and finds that working with 
interested stakeholders leads to more satisfying and productive 
results.92 WAPA tailors public participation by identifying (1) the 
appropriate decision-making process, (2) the objectives for each stage 
of the process, (3) the information the agency hopes to gain at each 
stage of the process, (4) the impacted stakeholders, (5) the 
circumstances that affect selection of public involvement 
techniques,93 and (6) the sequencing of public involvement techniques 
to accomplish needed information exchange.94 
While the agency customizes the public involvement approach for 
each leg of a project,95 the following two-step explanation illustrates 
the overall process. In step one, WAPA informs the public of the 
issue(s) and gains information from the public on their view of the 
issue(s).96 To facilitate this process, the agency provides the public 
with information about the nature of the project, the issue(s) that may 
arise, and how the public can get more information and participate.97 
Next, the agency actively seeks to understand how significant 
 
88 Id.; see also Shadi Hakimi & Kara M. Kockelman, Right-of-Way Acquisition and 
Property Condemnation: A Comparison of U.S. State Laws, 44 J. TRANSP. RES. F. 45, 50–
52 (2005) (analyzing state condemnation rates; many states have condemnation rates 
above 10%). 
89 WAPA, supra note 87, at 1. 
90 Id. at 7 (citing INT’L ASS’N FOR PUB. PARTICIPATION, IAP2 SPECTRUM OF PUBLIC 
PARTICIPATION (2000)). 
91 WAPA, supra note 87, at 1. 
92 Id. 
93 Public involvement techniques are the various techniques a developer can use to 
engage the public; there is a wide range of options, from hosting open houses to holding 
votes. Public Involvement Techniques, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., http://www.planning.dot 
.gov/publicinvolvement/pi_documents/techniques.asp (last visited Oct. 27, 2014). 
94 WAPA, supra note 87, at 2. 
95 Id. 
96 Id. at 1–2, 8 fig.2. 
97 Id. at 8 fig.2. 
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stakeholders view the issue(s) and their level of interest.98 
Alternatively, for step one, the agency might provide the public with 
all of the available project options and get feedback on each option.99 
In step two, WAPA takes the gathered information and attempts to 
make a decision that is both technically and politically feasible.100 
After making its decision, WAPA provides the public with an 
explanation of its preferred choice and the process for reviewing the 
decision.101 The agency then holds itself out for suggestions and 
reactions to the decision.102 After considering feedback, the agency 
announces the final decision.103 WAPA may carry out this process 
several times for different aspects or geographic areas of a project.104 
This process has been very successful in avoiding holdouts on 
large projects. For the 350-mile-long California-Oregon Transmission 
Project, WAPA secured easements on 400 parcels, and used eminent 
domain with only three landowners, a holdout rate of less than 1%.105 
However, for smaller projects, such as the thirty-mile-long Griffith 
Energy Project, one of the landowners held out, resulting in a holdout 
rate of over 9%.106 While WAPA did not eliminate all holdouts, the 
earnest use of public participation seems to strongly encourage 
cooperation. 
b. Nebraska Public Power District Case Study 
The Nebraska Public Power District (NPPD) works diligently to 
involve the public in the transmission planning process. The Land 
Manager for NPPD, Alan Beiermann, said using the “personal 
approach” has allowed the utility to complete projects with voluntary 
participation rates of 98–100%.107 
The first phase of NPPD’s public involvement approach is to reach 
out to regulators, municipalities, community organizations, and 
 
98 Id. 
99 Id. 
100 Id. at 9 fig.2. 
101 Id. 
102 Id. 
103 Id. 
104 Id. at 1. 
105 WAPA, supra note 87, at 5. 
106 Id. 
107 Telephone Interview with Alan Beiermann, Land Manager, and Terry Warth, 
Manager of Advocacy Group Relation, Nebraska Public Power District (June 25, 2013) 
[hereinafter NPPD Interview]. 
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industry representatives.108 The goal of this phase is to raise 
awareness, educate stakeholders, and address as many concerns as 
possible before meeting with affected landowners. To win over 
skeptics at all phases, NPPD communicates the need and purpose of 
the projects and describes how the utility will be responsible in 
carrying out its tasks on the ground. 
In the second phase of the public involvement approach, NPPD 
connects with members of the public, implementing the “personal 
approach.” NPPD’s process involves three rounds of open houses 
where the public is invited to review information and ask questions 
about the project.109 Moreover, NPPD not only provides public notice 
by placing ads in post offices and newspapers, but the utility also 
sends personal invitations to all potentially affected landowners 
recorded with county assessors.110 For the R-Project transmission line, 
the utility contacted 3,700 landowners along the prospective 220-mile 
line.111 Additionally, NPPD hosts multiple open houses at different 
geographic locations for the public’s convenience.112 Through these 
efforts, NPPD’s open houses have drawn up to 25% of landowners, 
compared to the 5–10% drawn by other utilities.113 
In addition to contacting landowners by mail, NPPD takes 
additional steps to accommodate landowners. If landowners cannot 
attend an open house, NPPD is happy to communicate with them 
individually.114 Moreover, for the South Sioux City Transmission 
Line, NPPD held morning and afternoon meetings to accommodate 
 
108 Id. 
109 Id.; see NEB. PUB. POWER DIST., PUBLIC INVOLVEMENT PROCESS (n.d.), available 
at http://www.nppd.com/assets/hoskins/publichearing/slide9.pdf. 
110 NPPD Interview, supra note 107; see Transmission Line Open Houses Scheduled, 
NEB. PUB. POWER DIST. (Jan. 7, 2013), http://www.nppd.com/2013/transmission-line        
-open-houses-scheduled/ (“Landowners in the study area have been sent invitations to 
attend an open house at a location convenient for them.”). 
111 NPPD Interview, supra note 107. 
112 Id.; see Transmission Line Open Houses Scheduled, supra note 110. 
113 NPPD Interview, supra note 107. For example, in the first round of open houses for 
the R-Project, nearly 600 people attended meetings. This represents 16% of the 3700 
people invited; with two more rounds of interviews to go, this number will likely increase. 
NEB. PUB. POWER DIST., TRANSMISSION LINE OPEN HOUSES SET FOR SEPTEMBER (2013), 
available at http://www.nppd.com/assets/rproject/august2013.pdf. 
114 This could be accomplished through phone calls. There is also a place to submit 
comments online. NPPD Interview, supra note 107; e.g., Submit Your Comments, NEB. 
PUB. POWER DIST., http://www.nppd.com/rproject/submit-your-comments/ (last visited 
Oct. 27, 2014). 
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residents who work day or night shifts.115 NPPD’s open houses 
typically run for six hours, which is longer than the open houses 
hosted by other utilities.116 
The three rounds of open houses help NPPD find the best routes 
for its transmission projects.117 The utility uses the first round of 
meetings to discuss the study area broadly.118 In these meetings, the 
public gives NPPD information on personal land development, small 
cemeteries, and other information to help the utility proactively avoid 
routing problems.119 After analyzing this information, NPPD develops 
possible corridors, which the community responds to in the second 
round of open houses.120 Then, from the feedback in the second 
round, NPPD narrows down the possible corridors to a preferred route 
and alternative route(s), and seeks comment in the third round.121 
After going through a statutorily required public hearing and 
receiving public comment, NPPD announces a final route.122 
The third and final phase of the public participation approach 
occurs after the utility obtains the easements and begins 
construction.123 NPPD stays in contact with landowners and local 
officials to make sure concerns are still being heard and addressed.124 
Because construction may damage surrounding land, it is important 
that NPPD restores the land to retain credibility for future 
development and ongoing relationships with the landowners.125 At the 
 
115 NPPD Hosting South Sioux City Transmission Line Open Houses, NEB. PUB. 
POWER DIST. (Jan. 21, 2010), http://www.nppd.com/south-sioux-city/nppd-hosting-south  
-sioux-city-transmission-line-open-houses/. 
116 Compare id. (six hour open house), and AEP Ohio Announces Plans for New 
Transmission Line in Ross County, AM. ELEC. POWER CO., INC. (May 14, 2013), 
https://www.aepohio.com/info/news/view Release.aspx?releaseID=1389 (two hour open 
house). 
117 NPPD Interview, supra note 107. 
118 Id. 
119 Id.; see NEB. PUB. POWER DIST., TELL US WHAT YOU KNOW (n.d.), available at 
http://www.nppd.com/assets/hoskins/openhouse2/slide13.pdf. 
120 NPPD Interview, supra note 107. 
121 Id. 
122 Id. 
123 Id. 
124 Id.; see NEB. PUB. POWER DIST., RIGHT-OF-WAY ACTIVITIES (n.d.), available at 
http://www.nppd.com/assets/hoskins/openhouse2/slide18.pdf (“We strive to build positive, 
long-term relationships with landowners and tenants[.]”). The agency notes this goal is 
partly achieved through providing construction damage compensation for property 
restoration. 
125 NPPD Interview, supra note 107. 
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end of the day, NPPD has the power to exercise eminent domain but 
uses it sparingly.126 
2. Private Information Approach 
One study found that adoption of either a private or a public 
information approach may not actually affect the holdout rate.127 If 
this premise is accepted, one might prefer to adopt the private 
information approach because it can be more profitable for the 
developer.128 Therefore, merchant transmission developers might 
prefer the private information approach, since many lack eminent 
domain authority and are not statutorily required to provide project 
details to the public like traditional utilities. Below is a case study of 
one of the biggest private land assemblies in U.S. history.129 
a. Jim Rouse Case Study 
In 1963, real estate developer, Jim Rouse, acquired roughly 15,000 
acres in Howard county Maryland without the aid of eminent 
domain.130 Within a few years, the rural area was transformed into the 
City of Columbia, Maryland, a sizable bedroom-community of 
Washington D.C.131 
To avoid the holdout problem, Rouse kept information private.132 
He formed several puppet corporations creating the illusion of 
multiple buyers, each corporation employing a different realtor.133 
The technique was successful because the community did not know 
the purpose of the land acquisition.134 The community speculated that 
 
126 Id.; Art Hovey, NPPD Gearing Up Again for Keystone XL Role, 
JOURNALSTAR.COM (Oct. 9, 2013), http://journalstar.com/news/state-and-regional 
/nebraska/nppd-gearing-up-again-for-keystone-xl-role/article_d96ff409-ea72-59fc-96e2    
-92d2d6802c50.html. 
127 COLLINS & ISAAC, supra note 74, at 9. 
128 Id. at 13, 15. 
129 See generally STEPHEN PECA, REAL ESTATE DEVELOPMENT AND INVESTMENT: A 
COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH 48 (Wiley 2009). 
130 EICHLER & KAPLAN, supra note 81, at 61. 
131 See DAVID STEBENNE & JOSEPH MITCHELL, NEW CITY UPON A HILL: A HISTORY 
OF COLUMBIA, MARYLAND 11 (History Press 2007). In 2010, the population of Columbia, 
Maryland, reached 99,615. State & County QuickFacts: Columbia CDP, Maryland, U.S. 
CENSUS BUREAU, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/24/2419125.html (last updated 
July 8, 2014). 
132 STEBENNE & MITCHELL, supra note 131, at 57; EICHLER & KAPLAN, supra note 81, 
at 61. 
133 EICHLER & KAPLAN, supra note 81, at 61. 
134 STEBENNE & MITCHELL, supra note 131, at 56. 
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the land was being acquired for a number of different reasons—
everything from a Russian diplomatic complex to a landfill—making 
it difficult for landowners to estimate the project’s economic value 
and extract excessive profits.135 
To gauge landowners’ subjective valuations, offers were 
individualized based on the personality of the owner and the nature of 
the property.136 The first piece of property was acquired for $667 per 
acre,137 and the final average cost of land was $1,450 per acre.138 This 
rise in price seems to indicate that as public awareness increased so 
did the price Rouse had to pay to avoid holdouts.139 In the end, five 
landowners held out a total of 850 acres—a holdout rate of 5.5% for 
landowners, and 6% for acreage.140 
3. Why Public Information Is Better Suited for Transmission 
Development 
At first blush, the private information approach may appear to be 
an acceptable avenue for assembling transmission corridors. The 
approach does not threaten property rights and allows individuals to 
contract voluntarily. Moreover, it does not create a circumstance 
where the government must choose between industry and individuals, 
and thus eliminates the risk of the government using taxpayer dollars 
to support economically wasteful projects. The private approach may 
also produce greater returns for merchant transmission developers. 
Regardless of these positive aspects, the private information approach 
is ill-suited for transmission development. 
The main problem with using the private information approach is 
that it fails to remedy the holdout problem. While the approach 
worked for Jim Rouse in Columbia, it would not work well for 
transmission projects. First, transmission corridors have a distinct 
geographic footprint (long slender corridors between areas with low 
population that lead into larger population areas), which allows a 
 
135 Id. at 57. 
136 EICHLER & KAPLAN, supra note 81, at 61. 
137 $1,000,000 / 1500 acres = $667. Id. at 58. 
138 Id. at 61. 
139 The cost of public awareness seems to be indicated by final cost per acre being more 
than twice the cost per acre of the first parcel acquired, $1450/$667=217%. The increased 
price could be attributed to paying for improvements to real property and other unique 
features, but the increase in cost is likely, at least in-part, from holdout. 
140 EICHLER & KAPLAN, supra note 81, at 61. 
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single landowner to holdout and kill a project. Second, the distinct 
geographic footprint could tip-off savvy landowners that the project 
has only one developer. Moreover, as more projects occur nationally, 
it would become easier to identify these land grabs with transmission 
projects. Furthermore, the frequent use of the private information 
approach to fool landowners would likely create opposition and 
political hostility—as landowner displeasure and public sympathy 
would likely grow. This could create a significant barrier and block 
society from receiving the benefits of interstate transmission 
development. 
Therefore, a public participation approach, like the one adopted by 
NPPD, is a better choice. Several studies support this choice, finding 
that public participation reduces conflict and produces greater 
satisfaction for participants.141 While the public participation 
approach shows great promise in reducing landowner holdout, 
coupling it with collective decision making and common ownership 
will create a new land-assembly framework that can increase 
voluntary participation and promote procedural and cost efficiencies. 
B. Land-Assembly Frameworks that Encourage Landowner 
Participation 
In addition to minimizing holdouts through public involvement, 
adopting an organizational structure that incorporates collective 
decision making and common ownership would overcome several 
shortcomings of eminent domain. The use of collective decision can 
alleviate problems associated with determining land values,142 
appropriate public uses,143 and which holdouts should be vetoed.144 
The use of common ownership can eliminate landowner hesitancy to 
collaborate with other landowners.145 
 
141 See DUKE & BROMLEY, supra note 69, at 3; COLLINS & ISAAC, supra note 74, at 
14–15; Freeman & Langbein, supra note 85, at 62, 67, 80, 109–10 (discussing an EPA 
study of the negotiated rulemaking process, which found that negotiations reduce conflict, 
and increase participant satisfaction and commitment to results); but cf. Kevin Begos, 
Some Say Industry Arrogance Fueled Fracking Anger, ASSOCIATED PRESS, July 28, 2013,  
available at http://bigstory.ap.org/article/some-say-industry-arrogance-fueled-fracking      
-anger; John Green, Plan Gives Marshall Co. a Jolt, HUTCHNEWS.COM (Apr. 14, 2013 
12:00 AM), http://hutchnews.com/news/plan-gives-marshall-co-a-jolt/article_9591f01a-4 
461-5143-9675-3d3cc4c9e373.html. 
142 Heller & Hills, supra note 8, at 1470–71, 1498. 
143 Id. at 1470–71. 
144 Id. at 1469–70. 
145 See id. at 1501; Lehavi & Licht, supra note 18, at 1732–34. 
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Many scholars have attempted to reform eminent domain by 
redefining “just compensation” and “public use.”146 This approach 
leaves the ultimate decision-making power in the hands of 
disinterested experts—that is, judges still define what is public use 
and appraisers still determine what is just compensation.147 A better 
solution might be giving a say to those with the most invested in the 
community: landholders.148 
First, to overcome the problem of denying fair compensation, 
landowners should be provided an opportunity to vote on what is just 
compensation. By requiring a majority of landowners to approve a 
project, the subjective valuations of at least half of the landowners 
would be represented.149 This would also provide landowners an 
opportunity to capture some of the profits associated with the 
increased value of the aggregated parcel—an improvement over the 
FMV model. 
Second, providing landowners with the ability to vote would allow 
the public to approve or reject projects. As members of the 
community, landowners are in a good position to decide which 
projects promote public use.150 Moreover, landowners could veto 
holdouts who wish to block socially beneficial development.151 By 
giving landowners a voice in the decision-making process, those with 
a vested interest in the community would be the ones to decide what 
happens to it.152 
Third, adopting a common-ownership structure, as prescribed by 
economist Ronald Coase, would minimize transaction costs for 
landowners by creating a safe way for them to pool their resources.153 
Transaction costs typically consist of the time and effort landowners 
spend researching and negotiating to ensure fair treatment.154 These 
 
146 Heller & Hills, supra note 8, at 1470–71. 
147 Id. 
148 Id. 
149 Id. at 1498. 
150 Id. at 1469–70. 
151 Id. at 1470–71. 
152 The problem of burdening landowners is largely resolved by giving them the ability 
to decide which projects promote the public use and the amount of compensation they 
require. However, in the case of essential public works, compulsory eminent domain 
should always be an option. 
153 Lehavi & Licht, supra note 18, at 1732 (citing R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 
4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937)). 
154 Id. 
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costs are often inflated when the parties believe others will take 
advantage of them.155 To limit the risk that landowners will use 
influence to take advantage of each other, profits should be 
distributed based on an ex ante formula that is tied to landowners’ 
pre-project property values.156 Moreover, to limit opportunistic 
behavior, an organizational framework should minimize 
management’s discretion to do anything but maximize the buyout 
price of an aggregated parcel.157  
Below, Part II.B.1 discusses a variety of collective decision-
making and common-ownership structures. After outlining the 
governance and procedural components of each structure, Part II.B.2 
proposes a new property acquisition framework for transmission 
development, which borrows from each structure. Part II.B.2 then 
concludes by analyzing possible legal challenges to this new property 
form and the legal obligations of transmission providers. 
1. Existing and Proposed Property Structures 
a. Land Readjustment 
Land Readjustment (LR) is a property framework, discussed by 
George Liebmann, which is commonly used in Europe and Asia to 
redevelop underutilized neighborhoods.158 Through this framework, 
residents in a geographic area agree to privately assemble their land 
and redevelop their neighborhood.159 A distinct feature of LR is that 
landowners sacrifice a percentage of their original parcels to fund the 
project.160 
Like other collective decision-making frameworks, the advantage 
of LR is that it cures many of the problems that plague private land-
assembly techniques and eminent domain. LR incentivizes 
landowners to participate in projects by providing them with an 
opportunity to share in future profits of redevelopment.161 LR, as 
 
155 Id. at 1732–33. 
156 Id. 
157 Id. at 1733–34, 1742–45 (citing OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE MECHANISMS OF 
GOVERNANCE 378 (1996)). 
158 George W. Liebmann, Land Readjustment for America: A Proposal for a Statute, 32 
URB. LAW. 1, 2–3 (2000). 
159 Id. at 2. 
160 Michael M. Shultz & Frank Schnidman, The Potential Application of Land 
Readjustment in the United States, 22 URB. LAW. 197, 198 (1990). 
161 Liebmann, supra note 158, at 2. 
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practiced in different countries, operates as either a compulsory or 
voluntary land-assembly model.162 In countries where participation is 
voluntary, dissenters can exclude their property from the project.163 
Additionally, LR reduces the need for project financing because the 
landowners who participate voluntarily eliminate the carrying cost of 
holding land while development takes place.164 
The procedure to initiate an LR requires 25% of landowners—
based on individuals or acreage—to petition for a land readjustment 
district.165 Once 25% of landowners join the petition, notice is provide 
to all landowners.166 
After receiving notice, objectors have sixty days to act.167 In a 
voluntary land-assembly framework,168 the council (generally a 
municipality,169 though for transmission projects the council may be a 
public utility commission)170 then holds legislative hearings to 
determine if objections warrant an amendment to, or rejection of, the 
project.171 To avoid delay, which is common in eminent domain 
proceedings, the council’s hearings and decision must take place take 
within a thirty-day period.172 
If the council approves the LR project, petitioners must then secure 
a majority of the landowners’ signatures.173 Once a sufficient majority 
has signed on, the council must issue a Certificate of Organization, 
 
162 Shultz & Schnidman, supra note 160, at 224–33. 
163 Id. 
164 Liebmann, supra note 158, at 2. 
165 The 25% requirement was originally proposed by the National Association of Real 
Estate Boards in 1935. Id. at 7–8. 
166  Id. 
167 Id. at 7. 
168 Under a compulsory framework, the project would have to support a public use to 
satisfy the takings requirement. Moreover, procedural requirements involved with eminent 
domain might increase the odds of delay and cost. 
169 Liebmann, supra note 158, at 8–9. 
170 The authority over the placement and construction of power lines has traditionally 
been with the states. HEMPLING I, supra note 3, at 17 (quoting Cal. Wilderness Coal. v. 
U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 631 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 2011)). 
171 Liebmann, supra note 158, at 8. Legislative hearings are less apt to oppress 
underfunded and landowners who are uncomfortable with formal judicial proceedings. 
172 Id. at 8–9. 
173 The type of majority can differ: in Taiwan, only a simple majority is needed; in 
Japan, a two-thirds majority is required. In the United States, “[o]f the seventeen states 
specifying participation percentages for creation of soil conservation districts, fourteen 
specified percentages between 65% and 67%, the extremes being 60% and 75%.” Id. at 9 
(citing WILLIAM PARKS, SOIL CONSERVATION DISTRICTS IN ACTION (1962)). 
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and give all landowners in the LR boundaries thirty-days’ notice of 
the organization’s meeting date.174 At the meeting(s), an unbiased 
person designated by the council facilitates the election of the 
governing board.175 To hold a vote, a quorum of 50% of landowners is 
typically required; however, one proposed statute requires as little as 
10%.176 
The board has the same powers as those provided to the boards of 
business corporations.177 Generally, the board has the power to 
perform the actions necessary to effectuate the purposes of the plan, 
including contracting, bringing lawsuits, issuing bonds, and assessing 
taxes to help pay for administrative costs.178 
The next step of the newly elected board is to create a development 
plan. The plan must contain a budget, a completion schedule, a 
description of the basis of profit allocation, and any proposed 
continuing activities of the district after redevelopment occurs. 
Moreover, the plan should aim to create a project that is (1) minimally 
intrusive, both physically and aesthetically, (2) environmentally 
sensitive, and (3) beneficial at the local, regional, national, and global 
level.179 The board “may designate an operating officer, who need not 
be an owner within the district, to carry out the [p]lan of 
redevelopment.”180 Often, the natural choice is a developer.181 
 
174 Id. In the context of transmission line development, several meetings may be 
beneficial if the geography of a project warrants it, particularly in the case of a large 
transmission project. 
175 Id. at 10 (explaining that the governing board shall consist of a chairman, secretary, 
treasurer, and three additional directors). 
176 Id. 
177 Id. at 17. 
178 Id. at 18–20 (noting that there should be no constitutional problems with assessing 
taxes to provide administrative services). 
179 See id. at 11. In the context of transmission projects: (1) “minimally intrusive 
physically and aesthetically” might mean using single poles or longer distances between 
poles; (2) “environmentally sensitive” might mean not using treated woods and other 
construction practices; (3) and “beneficial at the local scale” might mean public works to 
improve drainage and soil quality, job creation, or demand for local supplies. See Jennifer 
DeWitt, Transmission Line Project Signs Mitigation Agreement, QUAD CITY BUS. J. (June 
2, 2013, 1:00 PM), http://qctimes.com/business/transmission-line-project-signs-mitigation 
-agreement/article_8f870190-d6a0-5c3a-a06b-ea55d11d5fd0.html (“Clean Line will avoid 
the use of treated wood for construction matting and the use of herbicides and fertilizers if 
requested by a landowner. In addition, Rock Island Clean Line has committed to a 
provision to use monopole structures, which have a smaller foundation.”). 
180 Liebmann, supra note 158, at 11. 
181 Id. 
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After the board develops the plan, they must provide owners with 
thirty-days’ notice and an opportunity to respond.182 Once owners 
adopt the plan, the council evaluates and approves the plan.183 The 
plan is then recorded in the land records.184 
Concurring landowners can be compensated either by receiving 
shares in the LR project or in-kind distributions.185 Landowners who 
dissent from the plan may receive FMV compensation.186 To 
encourage landowners to make their decisions quickly, a landowners’ 
decision to dissent must be irrevocable.187 The aim of this procedure 
is to limit landowners’ ability to “‘[hold] out’ in order to negotiate 
blackmail payments . . . .”188 
b. Land Assembly District 
The Land Assembly District (LAD) is a property framework, 
proposed by Heller and Hills, which is similar to an irrigation district 
or a condominium framework.189 Through this framework a majority 
of residents within a geographic area agree to join private land 
together to create a larger parcel for a new purpose.190 If adopted by a 
state legislature, LADs would be a powerful democratic tool to cure 
the holdout problem.191 
The advantage of the LAD scheme is that it answers many of the 
problems inherent in the eminent domain model. The LAD equips 
landowners with the power to veto a project if the terms do not meet a 
majority’s approval.192 Moreover, a majority of landowners can 
overcome other landowners who wish to block projects that may be 
socially beneficial.193 Lastly, the LAD scheme provides developers 
 
182 Id. at 12. 
183 Id. 
184 Id. 
185 Id. Here, an in-kind distribution would be a smaller but improved piece of land, as 
payment for the underdeveloped land that the landowner contributed to the project. 
186 Id. at 13. 
187 Id. at 13–14. 
188 Id. 
189 See Heller & Hills, supra note 8, at 1471. 
190 Id. at 1469–70. 
191 See id. 
192 Id. 
193 Id. 
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with an avenue to overcome landowners’ monopoly power to extract 
exorbitant compensation by seeking bids from competing LADs.194 
Local residents, a developer, or a community development 
corporation can initiate an LAD.195 The initiating entity proposes the 
LAD to a planning agency.196 Generally, the planning agency would 
be a government entity; for a transmission project, the planning 
agency could be a state public utility commission.197 The agency then 
gives notice to potentially affected parties, providing them the 
opportunity to attend and comment at meetings.198 At the meetings, 
the agency educates the neighbors “about the potential benefits and 
costs of an LAD . . . .”199 Landowners then vote to approve or reject 
the plan.  The degree and calculation of the majority could vary by 
state.200 
Once formed, “[t]he LAD would have the power to accept or reject 
proposals by developers to assemble the land . . . .”201 Also, LADs 
would have the power to solicit bids from multiple developers.202 
LAD governance could be modeled after Business Improvement 
Districts (BID), including rules on the establishment of the board and 
selection of the directors.203 
The LAD could also have the power of eminent domain and the 
ability to provide FMV payments to dissenting landowners.204 
However, Heller and Hills note that the LAD framework may be best 
 
194 Id. at 1507–09 (providing that through this process, each LAD would compete to 
sell its land to the buyer, analogous to the request for proposal process). 
195 Id. at 1488. 
196 Id. at 1489. 
197 See id. at 1489–90; SCOTT HEMPLING, WHO SHOULD DO WHAT? HOW ORDER 
1000’S REGIONAL TRANSMISSION PLANNING CAN SUPPORT STATE RESOURCE PLANNING 
17 (2012) [hereinafter HEMPLING II], available at http://www.scotthemplinglaw.com 
/files/pdf/ppr_order_1000-state_planning_hempling0612.pdf. See Part II.B.2 for a 
discussion on the entities that are well suited for implementing transmission development 
projects. 
198 Heller & Hills, supra note 8, at 1490–91. 
199 Id. 
200 Id. at 1491–92. This point is discussed further in Part II.B.2.a. 
201 Heller & Hills, supra note 8, at 1495. 
202 Id. at 1495–96. 
203 Id. at 1489 (citing Richard Briffault, A Government for Our Time? Business 
Improvement Districts and Urban Governance, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 365, 377–81). 
204 There would be few opt-outs because the contingency fee for condemnation lawyers 
is only paid if they can improve on the LAD’s initial offer. This is unlikely to happen with 
a LAD. 
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suited to consolidate fragmented, as opposed to unique, land.205 To 
avoid holdouts associated with acquiring unique land, like acquiring 
the only viable site for an essential public works project, the authors 
state that eminent domain may be a more appropriate land-assembly 
framework.206 
The procedure for selling the LAD is akin to an auction.207 The 
LAD invites multiple developers to make bids and drive up the 
price.208 If one developer initiates a project and another developer 
wins the auction, the winning bidder compensates the initiating 
developer for the administrative costs incurred.209 After the bidding 
window closes, landowners vote again to determine if a majority 
approves the deal.210 Alternatively, if there is just one developer and 
multiple sites, the roles could reverse and the LADs would submit 
bids (with majority approval) to the developer.211 This is similar to a 
request for proposal. 
To avoid the use of political power to redistribute wealth unfairly, 
LAD legislation should determine how profits are to be allocated—
either by acreage or property value.212 Upon the sale of the LAD, 
landowners receive their proceeds based on ex ante amount 
proscribed by the enabling statute.213 However, because some LADs 
may fail, legislation should include statutory deadlines to avoid 
neighborhoods falling into a “nondevelopment limbo.”214 
c. Special Purpose Development Corporation 
The Special Purpose Development Corporation (SPDC) is a 
property framework, discussed by Amnon Lehavi and Amir Licht, 
that allows for the creation of short-lived corporations, which 
 
205 Heller & Hills, supra note 8, at 1492–93. 
206 Id. at 1492–97. 
207 Id. at 1495–96. 
208 Id. at 1496. 
209 Id. 
210 Id. at 1495–96. 
211 Id. at 1510 (“Had each proposed site been formed into a LAD, then the City of 
Detroit could have held an auction in which each LAD competed to sell its land to GMC. 
The competition for sites would resemble the normal bidding process by which contractors 
compete to sell goods to cities.”). 
212 Id. at 1501. 
213 Id. (“State law should require that the proceeds be distributed according to each 
landowner’s share of property within the LAD.”). 
214 Id. at 1496. 
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provides landowners compensation based on the market price for an 
aggregated parcel.215 Through this framework, a governmental entity 
pools land and creates a special corporation to sell the land to the 
highest bidder.216  
The advantage of the SPDC framework is that it promises to 
provide fair compensation and accomplish development in an 
expedient manner. SPDCs provide landowners with fairer 
compensation than the compensation provided by FMV under the 
current eminent domain system because it does not assume all sellers 
are willing sellers.217 Instead, SPDCs allow landowners to share in an 
increased profit from a higher value of an aggregated parcel and an 
improved bargaining position that the landowners have as a unified 
group.218 SPDCs can also be expedient because common-ownership 
structures minimize transactional delays and costs stemming from 
fear of majoritarian abuse.219 Additionally, SPDCs promote 
expediency by using eminent domain to cure remaining holdouts.220 
The major drawback to this approach is that it does not seek 
community input. 
The procedure for forming an SPDC starts with a public authority 
deciding that a project is worth pursuing and incorporating an 
SPDC.221 In the transmission context, this would likely be a public 
utility commission.222 The public authority then begins to assemble 
land, offering landowners either the FMV for their land in the form of 
cash or shares in the SPDC.223 Due to securities regulations, SPDC’s 
should provide ample information to landowners, allowing them to 
make an informed decision about which option to take.224 SPDCs 
would likely be public corporations with shares traded in an open 
market.225 
 
215 Lehavi & Licht, supra note 18, at 1737 (“The government would make the decision 
about the assembly of land and its use according to its judgment on the socially desirable 
use of the land.”) The sale price would be market-driven, like emissions trading schemes. 
216 Id. at 1742. 
217 Id. at 1707. 
218 Id. 
219 Id. at 1732–34. 
220 Id. at 1734–35. 
221 Id. at 1734. 
222 See HEMPLING II, supra note 197, at 17. See Part II.B.2 for a discussion on the 
entities that are well suited for implementing transmission development projects. 
223 Lehavi & Licht, supra note 18, at 1734–35. 
224 Id. at 1745–47. 
225 Id. at 1737. 
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Next, the public authority transfers land to the SPDC and provides 
concurring landowners with shares in the SPDC.226 The assembled 
parcel would likely have a much greater value than the individual 
properties, and shareholders could realize returns well in excess of 
their property’s theoretical FMVs.227 Not only is this because 
transaction costs related to the holdouts are minimized,228 but the land 
will likely be rezoned to a higher and better use.229 Moreover, 
shareholders would also benefit from the SPDC’s ability to either 
create a bidding war among private developers or hire negotiators to 
extract the greatest price from a single developer.230 
Once the land sells, the SPDC distributes net proceeds from the 
sale as dividends to its shareholders.231 Shareholders receive their 
share as a percentage of pre-project land value contributed over the 
aggregate pre-project land value of all contributions.232 The total 
shares are comprised of shares held by private parties, for private land 
contributed, and the government, for public land contributed as well 
as administrative costs.233 Once the SPDC distributes net proceeds, 
the entity dissolves.234 
Managers’ powers should be limited in governing the SPDC.235 
Lehavi and Licht believe that expansive discretion on the part of 
management can lead to unnecessarily risky business decisions and 
the possibility of management abusing its access to financial 
resources.236 Since the SPDC’s purpose is simply to sell the 
aggregated parcel at the highest price in an expedient manner, a 
Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) governance model would be 
appropriate.237 Under the SPV model, the corporation is “run 
essentially from the outside by an unrelated trustee [or] administrator 
. . . .”238 Moreover, the SPV could have a limited life that matches its 
 
226 Id. at 1733–35. 
227 Id. at 1736-37. 
228 Id. at 1735, 1732–33. 
229 Heller & Hills, supra note 8, at 1489. 
230 Lehavi & Licht, supra note 18, at 1735. 
231 Id. at 1735. 
232 Id. 
233 Id. at 1739. 
234 Id. at 1735. 
235 Id. at 1740–43. 
236 Id. at 1741. 
237 Id. at 1742. 
238 Id. 
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obligations.239 In addition to limiting managerial discretion, the SPV 
structure would also create “bankruptcy remoteness” for the public 
authority, protecting the assets of entity overseeing the project from 
the unlikely bankruptcy of the SPDC.240 
d. Equity Model Limited Liability Corporation 
The Equity Model Limited Liability Corporation (LLC) is a 
property framework proposed by Ralph J. Basile, a developer, which 
allows an entity to pool land through private contract.241 Through this 
structure, a developer or government entity attempts to pool land and 
to provide contributing landowners a share in the LLC.242 The aim of 
the LLC is to assemble land and minimize carrying costs without the 
use of eminent domain.243 
The organizational structure provides a property form that takes 
advantage of collective decision making without the use of eminent 
domain.244 Landowners contribute their land and receive shares in the 
LLC as limited partners.245 As limited partners, landowners can 
receive future cash-flows generated by the project or sell their 
shares.246 The developer or another party is the general partner, who 
prepares the ground lease(s) and negotiates other agreements.247 The 
developer constructs and owns any improvements to the land.248 The 
application of the LLC model to land assembly may be extremely 
powerful and useful where eminent domain is not available.249 
2. A New Property Framework: Transmission Corridor District 
(TCD) 
Each of the land assembly structures discussed above has several 
strengths and weaknesses, depending on what one wants to 
 
239 Id. 
240 Id. 
241 RALPH J. BASILE, SURVIVING IN A TRANSITIONING ECONOMY: LAND ASSEMBLY 
STRATEGIES FOR BETTER PLANNING NOW 10 (2010), available at http://redevelopment 
.net/wp-content/uploads/2010/11/Wed05-National-Economic-Recovery-Surviving-in-a      
-Transitioning-Economy-Ralph-Basile.pdf. 
242 Id. 
243 Id. at 9–10. 
244 Id. at 10–11. 
245 Id.  
246 Id. at 10–12. 
247 Id. at 12. 
248 Id. 
249 See generally id. at 1–13. 
GERSTLE (DO NOT DELETE) 12/15/2014  8:28 AM 
2014] Giving Landowners the Power: A Democratic Approach 569 
for Assembling Transmission Corridors 
accomplish. Based on the strengths of each structure, this section 
proposes a new property framework that is specifically tailored for 
assembling transmission corridors, a Transmission Corridor District 
(TCD). 
Landowners, a developer, or a governmental entity could initiate a 
TCD proceeding. The initiating party approaches the planning agency 
to determine if the transmission line promotes reliability, economic 
development, or public policy (e.g., a renewable energy portfolio 
standard).250 In this initial discussion with the planning agency, the 
initiating entity proposes a study area for the transmission corridor to 
the planning agency. Alternatively, the planning agency could 
determine that there is a need for a transmission project and initiate 
the TCD proceeding on its own. 
For TCD proceedings, the planning agency would likely be a 
public utility commission (PUC). This is necessary because the 
placement and construction of power lines is almost always under the 
purview of the states, which then designate siting and approval 
responsibilities to the PUC or state equivalent.251 Alternatively, the 
planning agency could be a federal252 or regional entity to promote 
interstate development.253 
Upon approval from the planning agency, the initiating party and 
planning agency work together to educate the potentially affected 
members of the public about the benefits and negative effects of the 
proposed project. Meetings should be held in convenient 
jurisdictional and geographical locations after providing at least 
thirty-days’ notice. 
After the first round of meetings, the planning agency compiles the 
comments and narrows down the study area to potential corridors. 
The planning agency then creates numerous routes, composed of 
 
250 See Heller & Hills, supra note 8, at 1489–90. 
251 See HEMPLING I, supra note 3, at 16–17 (quoting Cal. Wilderness Coal. v. U.S. 
Dep’t of Energy, 631 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 2011)). 
252 Today, FERC currently has backstop siting authority in the rare occurrence that 
states fail to act within a year and only if the line is in a national interest electric 
transmission corridor. Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 824p(b) (2012); see HEMPLING II, 
supra note 197, at 16; Rossi, supra note 38, at 1033–36. 
253 Building on the principles that guided Congress to enact section 216(h) and FERC 
to write Order 1000, granting additional authority to entities that could preempt state law 
or implement transmission projects on a regional or interregional level would be the next 
step. To encourage interstate coordination, Congress might provide additional authority to 
FERC or to ISOs and RTOs. See HEMPLING II, supra note 197, at 16. 
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smaller segments that could be joined together in different ways to 
link the area of energy generation and energy demand. The segments 
should consist of properties with similar geographic characteristics 
and regulatory requirements. At the second set of meetings, the 
planning agency informs each segment individually about their role in 
the process. In order to move forward as a candidate for the corridor, 
each segment must obtain signatures of at least 25% of all 
landowners, based on acreage.254 Upon receiving the required 
landowner signatures, the planning agency may proceed with an 
assessment roll for each participating segment to determine final 
voting rights.255 However, in the interest of reducing administrative 
costs, this step may be skipped and voting rights could be based 
solely on acreage. 
Upon receiving the required signatures, each segment votes to elect 
a board with a quorum of at least 10% of ownership by acreage. The 
board acts as the voice for each segment and develops a set of 
physical, aesthetic, environmental, and compensatory requirements. If 
there are multiple developers, each developer would place contingent 
offers on the different segments to create a corridor. If there is just 
one developer, each segment would submit bids to that developer. 
Once the route has been determined and each bid or offer is 
accepted by at least 50% of landowners, easement rights would be 
moved into an SPV. Where no assessment roll is taken, a larger 
majority of landowners by acreage should be sought to ensure a single 
entity does not control voting on what is fair compensation. The use 
of an SPV is desirable here to act as a common-ownership entity with 
limited duration and discretionary powers. 
After a majority approves the bids, the SPV gives landowners 
tradable shares in the corporation and provides the winning developer 
with the right-of-way to access and to develop the transmission line. 
If an assessment roll was not carried out earlier, one could be carried 
out at this point to determine compensatory rights. However, if 
landowners consent, an assessment roll may be skipped altogether to 
avoid administrative costs, and instead, compensatory rights could be 
 
254 Acreage is easy to calculate, and at this stage in the process, costs should be limited. 
255 Through an assessment roll, all parcels are valued individually (using uniform 
practices) and landowners later receive proceeds based on their assessed pre-project value 
divided by the total pre-project value of all property assessed. Liebmann, supra note 158, 
at 10. While FMV would be used in the assessment roll process, the shortcoming of 
FMV—inability to measure subjective value and distribute the added value of the 
aggregated parcel—are remedied later in the TCD process. 
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determined by acreage; this would be most appropriate where land 
values are homogenous. Dissenting landowners must always be 
entitled to an FMV payment. 256 
The boards of each segment that are not part of the final corridor 
dissolve. For each segment that is included in the final corridor, the 
board selects one board member to join a representative group. The 
representative group carries on as powerful voice for landowners to 
express their concerns in the future. The representative group is 
funded by a small portion of predetermined shares allocated for this 
purpose. 
  
 
256 Just compensation is a taking requirement. U.S. CONST. amend. V. In the case of 
voluntary transactions, landowners may contract to agreements they see as appropriate.  
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TCD Timeline 
Day 0 Day 30 Day 60 
Initiating party and 
planning agency meet. 
The planning agency gives thirty-
days’ notice to landowners and 
prepares for meeting. 
The first meeting 
is held to discuss 
the study area. 
After 15 days of 
meeting, thirty-
days’ notice is 
given for the next 
meeting.  
Day 105 Day 135 Day 165 
The second meeting is 
held to inform each 
segment about the project 
and their ability to 
voluntarily take part in the 
project if enough 
signatures are collected. 
If 25% of landowners in a 
segment sign on, 30-days’ notice 
is provided for the segment to 
elect a board. 
Optional: Planning agency 
initiates assessment roll. 
The Board is 
elected, and meets 
with the 
landowners to 
develop a list of 
demands and 
discusses 
compensation. 
 Day 195 Day 225 Day 255 Day 285 Day 315 
Single 
Developer 
Board 
develops a 
bid. 
Landowners 
vote to 
accept the 
bid amount. 
Developer 
picks 
winning 
segments 
based on 
bids offered. 
Land, 
shares, and 
FMV 
distributed. 
SPV 
distributes 
dividends. 
Multiple 
Developers 
Developers 
make 
contingent 
offers to the 
different 
segments. 
Landowners 
vote to 
accept the 
highest offer 
amount. 
Land placed 
in SPV. 
Shares 
distributed 
to 
consenting 
owners. 
FMV 
distributed 
to dissenting
owners. 
SPV 
distributes 
dividends. 
 
 Optional: 
Planning 
agency 
initiates 
assessment 
roll. 
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a. Potential Legal and Pragmatic Problems for a TCD 
The implementation of a TCD raises several legal and pragmatic 
questions, many of which are shared by the frameworks discussed 
earlier. As luck would have it, the TCD appears to clear the legal and 
pragmatic hurdles before it. 
The first issue is to determine how compensatory and voting rights 
should be allocated. Rights can correspond to either the land 
contributed or the number of participating landowners.257 If rights 
correspond to each landowner, wealth would be redistributed as each 
participating landowners could hold different amounts of land with 
vastly different values.258 Therefore, rights should be based on the 
land contributed.   
The issue then becomes whether rights should be based on the 
benefit conferred on the project or based on the loss to the 
landowner.259 On the one hand, rights could be based on the benefit 
conferred on the project.260 This option is appealing because the 
uniqueness of an individual property’s uniqueness adds little value to 
the project value.261 To accomplish this, rights could be allocated 
based on acreage as other property attributes add little value to the 
project.262 This option is appealing because it makes calculating rights 
simple and inexpensive.263 On the other hand, rights could be based 
on the loss to the landowner.264 To accomplish this, rights could be 
allocated based on pre-project property values. This approach will 
likely be preferred to avoid the redistribution of wealth, as 
landowners are not only concerned with their acreage but the value of 
their property’s improvements and uniqueness.265 Therefore, 
allocating rights based on property value would minimize landowner 
opposition.266 
 
257 See Lehavi & Licht, supra note 18, at 1743–44 (allowing rights to be distributed 
equally based simply on landownership would redistribute land much like distributing 
rights based on acreage). 
258 See id. 
259 Id. at 1744. 
260 Id. 
261 See id. at 1744–45 (allowing rights to be distributed equally based simply on 
landownership would redistribute land much like distributing rights based on acreage). 
262 Id. at 1743–44. 
263 Id. 
264 See id. 
265 See id. at 1744. 
266 Id. 
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So, what issues might arise from allocating rights based on 
property value? In terms of voting rights, the Supreme Court’s “one 
person, one vote” doctrine stemming from the Equal Protection 
Clause267 may be an impediment.268 However, the Court has created 
an exception for special districts.269 Applying rational basis review, 
the Court has allowed for alternative voting systems when the system 
was reasonably related to the narrow function of the district.270 The 
TCD would have the narrow function of quickly assembling 
transmission corridors. The TCD’s alternative voting system, which 
maximizes buyout price and avoids the redistribution of wealth, 
would likely minimize opposition to development projects.271 Thus, 
allowing landowners272 to vote based on property value, and thereby 
reducing opposition to projects, would be reasonably related to the 
narrow function of quickly assembling transmission corridors.273  
An additional concern tied to voting rights in a TCD is that a group 
or entity with substantial voting rights might force the majority of 
landowners to accept a deal of which they do not approve. This might 
occur because entities like Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) 
hold land solely for investment purposes, and therefore may lack any 
shared subjective values common to owners who occupy their land.274 
Further, if acreage is used to determine voting rights, unjust results 
might occur where parties with large amounts of inexpensive acreage 
force owners of valuable property to accept insufficient offers. In the 
Business Investment District context, a number of states have limited 
the ability of powerful entities from dominating decision making 
 
267 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
268 Heller & Hills, supra note 8, at 1504 (citing Hadley v. Junior Coll. Dist., 397 U.S. 
50 (1970); Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969); Avery v. 
Midland Cnty., 390 U.S. 474 (1968)). 
269 Avery, 390 U.S. 474. 
270 Id. (citing Ball v. James, 451 U.S. 355 (1981); Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake 
Basin Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 719 (1973)). 
271 Id. (“The analogy to LADs is easy to draw: landowners’ shares of the proceeds from 
the LAD’s sale of a neighborhood would be allocated according to each landowner’s share 
of real estate within the district. Given that the power of LADs would be narrowly drawn 
to avoid redistribution of wealth, it would be odd to allocate voting power in a way that 
would facilitate such prohibited redistribution.”). 
272 Liebmann suggests that tenants have no right to vote. Liebmann, supra note 158, at 
15–16. However, Heller and Hills argue that the lessees should have a voting right, 
equivalent to value of their lease. Heller & Hills, supra note 8, at 1504–07. 
273 See Heller & Hills, supra note 8, at 1504; Ball v. James, 451 U.S. 355, 371 (1981). 
274 Heller & Hills, supra note 8, at 1501–02. 
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through different voting structures.275 Heller and Hills suggest that a 
single entity, such as a REIT, should be limited to a maximum voting 
share of 30%.276 
Moreover, in most states there is already an existing legal 
instrument that allows a majority of landowners to compel other 
landowners to join land.277 In the context of mineral leasing, a 
majority of landowners can compel non-consenting landowners to 
join their land through “forced pooling.”278 
The second issue is specifying how to limit powerful entities and 
majorities from redistributing wealth. To minimize this risk, enabling 
legislation should mandate how neighbors divide proceeds.279 The use 
of property value appears to be the best metric for allocating 
compensatory rights because it would be unfair for those who 
undertake the greatest financial sacrifice to realize anything but their 
proportional share of inputs. To accomplish this, an assessment roll 
should be taken.280 To address the administrative cost, an assessment 
roll could take advantage of economies of scale, and with the consent 
of landowners, something less than a formal assessment could be 
used.281 A less than formal assessment could accurately find the 
average value for each property class in the area and make individual 
adjustments for important distinctions between properties in the 
class.282 
The third issue arises when a landowner does not consent to the 
collective decision making of the TCD. The TCD must then provide 
 
275 Id. at 1502 n.88 (citing MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 400, § 3 (West 2004); N.M. 
STAT. ANN. § 3-63-6 (LexisNexis 1995); TENN. CODE ANN. § 7-84-511 (2005)). 
276 Id. at 1502. 
277 Forced pooling legislation has been upheld as constitutional. 38 AM. JUR. 2D Gas 
and Oil § 180 (2014). 
278 OIL & GAS ACCOUNTABILITY PROJECT, OIL & GAS AT YOUR DOOR? I-15 (2d ed. 
2005); Marie C. Baca, Forced Pooling: When Landowners Can’t Say No to Drilling, 
PROPUBLICA (May 18, 2011, 11:01PM), http://www.propublica.org/article/forced-pooling 
-when-landowners-cant-say-no-to-drilling. 
279 Heller & Hills, supra note 8, at 1501. 
280 Liebmann, supra note 158, at 10. Where an area has a homogenous physical and 
industrial landscape, such as large areas of range-land, acreage could be appropriate metric 
for compensatory rights. 
281 Cf. Burdsal, supra note 11, at 90 (noting that brining down administrative costs can 
be achieved by adopting less formal procedures). 
282 Because a less than formal assessment roll will mostly capture pre-project values, 
landowners who stand to receive compensation significantly above FMV may be willing 
to save on administrative costs and increase their compensation further. 
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the dissenting landowners FMV as a minimum for just 
compensation.283 Moreover, it is worth noting that based on the 
Suitum case, the Court may allow shares in a land assembly project to 
be used as just compensation for dissenting landowners.284 However, 
when landowners do not consent to receiving shares, immediate cash 
compensation would likely be required.285 In the abstract, it is hard to 
imagine many landowners would seek FMV, due to the fact that 
TCDs promise to provide superior bargaining power and profits from 
rezoning to a higher and better use. 
The fourth issue for a TCD implicates the Due Process Clause. The 
Due Process Clause requires that no person shall be deprived of 
property without notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard.286 
For the notice requirement, Liebmann suggests that notice should be 
sent by mail and published for owners to see.287 To satisfy the notice 
requirement, little else is required.288 Nonetheless, encouraging public 
involvement, as described in Part I.A., would encourage voluntary 
participation and satisfy procedural requirements. 
While there may be some unknowns regarding TCDs, the legal 
restrictions do not appear to be an impediment. The Equal Protection 
Clause relating to voting rights does not appear to be a barrier to 
TCDs. The procedural requirements of the Due Process Clause can 
also easily be satisfied. Given that the legal landscape likely allows 
for this new property framework, its adoption should seriously be 
considered. 
 
283 Landowners possess the right to voluntarily sell property and the Constitution 
provides an equitable mechanism for landowners whose land is condemned. See U.S. 
CONST. amend. V. 
284 Liebmann, supra note 158, at 13 (citing Suitum v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 
520 U.S. 725 (1997)). 
285  Liebmann, supra note 158, at 12 ("As recognized below, it is likely, but not certain, 
that immediate compensation of dissenters in cash is required.") (citing Babbitt v. Youpee, 
519 U.S. 234 (1997); Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704 (1987)). 
286 Michael Diamond, Note, ‘Energized’ Negotiations: Mediating Disputes over the 
Siting of Interstate Electric Transmission Lines, 26 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 217, 224 
(2011) (citing U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV); Lauren Mohr, 
Comment, The Tangled Web: Regulation, Interstate Pipeline Companies, and Due Process 
Rights of Property Owners, 26 ENERGY L.J. 191, 192–93 (2005). 
287 Liebmann, supra note 158, at 8. 
288 Under the Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 717–717z (2000), landowners’ Fifth 
Amendment rights to notice and opportunity to be heard in some instances have been 
reduced to a worthless hotline number. Diamond, supra note 286, at 224. 
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b. Regulatory Implications of the TCD: FERC Order No. 1000 
The Federal Power Act, FERC Order No. 1000 (Order 1000), and 
other laws, require transmission providers to pursue the least 
expensive transmission alternative.289 A 2012 industry study noted 
that land-assembly methods can represent as much as 10% of the cost 
of a transmission project.290 In comparison to traditional land-
assembly methods, voluntary participation is more likely with TCDs 
and thereby promises to create procedural291 and cost efficiencies.292 
Therefore, Order 1000 would seem to place an affirmative obligation 
on transmission providers to consider the TCD model or any model 
that achieves similar outcomes.293 
Moreover, Order 1000 forbids the distribution of transmission costs 
to those who do not receive a benefit from a project without their 
 
289 HEMPLING I, supra note 3, at 8, 14 n.7 (citing FERC Transmission Planning and 
Cost Allocation by Transmission Owning and Operating Public Utilities, 136 FERC ¶ 
61,051 at ¶ 148, ¶ 155 (2011); 16 U.S.C. § 824d(a) (2012)). 
290 BLACK & VEATCH, CAPITAL COSTS FOR TRANSMISSION AND SUBSTATIONS: 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR WECC TRANSMISSION EXPANSION PLANNING 2-6, available at 
https://www.wecc.biz/Reliability/BV_WECC_TransCostReport_Final.pdf; cf. RS&H, 
COMPETITIVE RENEWABLE ENERGY ZONE PROGRAM OVERSIGHT: CREZ PROGRESS 
REPORT NO. 4 at 4 (July 2011), available at http://www.texascrezprojects.com/systems 
/file_download.aspx?pg=339& ver=6 (“ROW costs vary . . . based on geographic location, 
population density, land use, and other factors.”). 
291 Several empirical studies find that the use of public participation techniques reduce 
conflict and yield increased satisfaction from participants. See DUKE & BROMLEY, supra 
note 69, at 3; COLLINS & ISAAC, supra note 74, at 14–15; Freeman & Langbein, supra 
note 85, 66–67, 109-10. By reducing conflict and increasing satisfaction, the process will 
likely be expedited. 
292 Improved procedural efficiencies through the mitigation of administrative process 
and landowner opposition should lead to cost reductions. Cf. Burdsal, supra note 11, at 
90–91; Heller & Hills, supra note 8, at 1482. Moreover, the use of a common ownership 
structure should reduce other transactions costs related to landowner fear that developers 
or other landowners will treat them unfairly. See Lehavi & Licht, supra note 18, at 1732–
33; DUKE & BROMLEY, supra note 69, at 17. 
293 HEMPLING II, supra note 197, at 2 (citing Transmission Planning and Cost 
Allocation by Transmission Owning and Operating Public Utilities, 136 FERC ¶ 61,051,   
¶ 80); James Heidell & Sandra Ringelstetter Ennis, FERC Order 1000 & Public Policy 
Transmission Projects, MONDAQ (2012), http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/168604 
/Utilities/FERC+Order+1000+Public+Policy+Transmission+Projects (quoting 
Transmission Planning and Cost Allocation by Transmission Owning and Operating 
Public Utilities, 136 FERC ¶ 61,051, ¶ 155-156) (“A public policy benefits analysis will 
need to incorporate an assessment of whether the transmission construction option is the 
least costly alternative.”). 
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consent.294 Therefore, if costs extend beyond an increase in rates and 
benefits are limited to receiving power from transmission,295 then the 
current eminent domain framework seems to violate Order 1000. The 
current eminent domain framework tends to undercompensate 
landowners (a cost) and many landowners do not receive power 
directly from high voltage long distance transmission lines (an 
unrealized benefit). However, courts may find indirect benefits from 
new transmission lines, such as improved regional reliability296 and 
energy independence. To remedy this potential problem, transmission 
providers should at least compensate landowners consistent with the 
majority of landowners’ subjective valuations of their property. 
CONCLUSION 
By creating uniform siting and condemnation laws, as well as 
including landowners in the planning and profits of development, land 
assembly should no longer act as a roadblock to the development of 
interstate transmission. Legislatures, transmission providers, and 
PUCs should seriously consider implementing the recommendations 
of this article because they show great promise in creating procedural 
and cost efficiencies, as well as promoting due process rights. 
Whether adopted by legislators, transmission providers, or other 
entities, the findings of this article represent a huge step forward in 
land-assembly thinking, whereby development would proceed 
without burdening landowners. Further, in the context of interstate 
transmission development, the findings of this article should help 
society realize the benefits of renewable energy, including the 
promotion of national energy independence, mitigation of climate 
change effects, and creation of economic opportunities for all 
Americans, especially in rural America. 
 
 
294 Transmission Planning and Cost Allocation by Transmission Owning and Operating 
Public Utilities, 136 FERC ¶ 61,051, ¶ 586(2). 
295 A benefit to landowners besides receiving power might be a reduction in greenhouse 
gases from renewable projects. However, a court might weigh the climate change benefits 
against negative local environmental impacts. 
296 Ill. Commerce Comm’n v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 721 F.3d 764, 774 (7th 
Cir. 2013). 
